My group is working on a piece of software that has several debugging features. The code will be part of a motor-control system when we are done. One of the features we have added is a small CLI (command-line interpreter) that we can use to change the parameters that control the motor and to see what effect these changes have on power consumption, heat, and other values tracked by our software. We first added the CLI just for our small group, but now we have found that both the QA and factory teams have come to depend on having it in place to do testing (QA) and preshipping checks in the factory.
As you might imagine, the ability to change the parameters of the motor once it has been shipped could lead to problems such as overheating, as well as a catastrophic failure of the motor. Even though our product is not meant to be some sort of IoT (Internet of Things) device, we do have a network connection available on our higher-end products so that the performance and wear on our motors can be measured over a network in the field.
I have told the QA and factory teams that there is no way we should leave this code in our shipping product because of the risks that the code would pose if an attacker could access it. They say the code is now too important to the product and have asked us to secure access to it in some way. Networked access to the device is provided only over a TLS (Transport Layer Security) link, and management now thinks we ought to provide a secure shell link to the CLI as well. Personally, I would rather just rip out all this code and pretend it never existed. Is there a middle path that will make the system secure but allow the QA and factory teams to have what they are now demanding?
CLI of Convenience
See earlier editions of KV to find my comments on prototypes, because they are relevant here (for example, "Beautiful Code Exists, If You Know Where to Look"; http://bit.ly/2C64HR2). The problem is that once you give a monkey a club, he is going to hit you with it if you try to take it away from him. The CLI you and your team have created is a nasty-looking club, and I would hate to get whacked with it.
The best way to reduce the attack surface of a piece of software is to remove any unnecessary code. Since you now have two teams demanding that you leave in the code, it is probably time to think about making two different versions of your binary. The application sounds like it is an embedded system, so I will guess it is written in C and take it from there.
The traditional way to include or exclude code features in C is via the prolific use of the
#define/#ifdef/#endif preprocessor macros and abuse of makefiles. The first thing to do is to split the CLI functions into two sets: readers and writers. The readers are all the functions that return values from the system, such as motor speed and temperature. The writers are all the functions that allow someone to modify the system's parameters. The CLI itself, including all the command-line editing and history functions, is its own piece of code. Each module is kept under an
#if/#endif pair such as this:
if defined (CLI_WRITER)
/* XXX Dangerous Code,
do not ship! */
CLI_WRITER should be defined only via the build system and never as a define in the code. You are liable to forget that you defined the value during some of your own testing or debugging, and commit your fixed code with the value defined.
With the code thus segmented, you now define two versions of your binary: TEST and SHIP. The TEST version has all the code, including the readers, the writers, and the CLI itself. The TEST version can also have any and all debug functions that the QA and factory teams want to have prior to shipping.
The SHIP version of the code has none of the debug features and only the reader module for the CLI. I would say it goes without saying that the CLI must not have a
system() -like function that allows the execution of arbitrary code. I would love to believe that could go without saying, but, guess what, I said it because I have seen too many systems with a "secure" CLI that contains a
The best way to reduce the attack surface of a piece of software is to remove any unnecessary code.
If at all possible, you should link all of your binaries statically, without using dynamic libraries or KLDs (kernel-loadable modules). Allowing for dynamically loadable code has two downsides. The first downside is that some monkey can come along later and re-add your writer functions to the system. The second downside is that you lose your protection against someone accidentally leaving in a call to a writer function when they should not. In a statically linked binary, all symbol references must be resolved during the linking phase. If someone leaves a stray call to a writer function somewhere in the code, this error will be flagged at link time, a final binary will not be produced, and you will not be able to ship a polluted binary accidentally.
In each of the reader, writer, and CLI modules you should place a specially named symbol that will remain in the final binary. Pick obvious names such as
cli_reader_mod, cli_writer_mod, and
cli_mod. Before any binary is shipped, either placed into a device at the factory or put up on the company's software-update server, a release script must be run to ensure the
cli_writer_mod symbol is not present in the shipping binary. The release script could look for a known function in the writer module, but programmers often like to change the names of functions, so adding a special symbol is easier and it is unlikely to change. For double extra bonus points, you can also have a version in each module to make debugging in the field somewhat easier. Do not add the version to the
cli_foo_mod symbols. Those symbol names are inviolate and should remain with the modules for their entire usable lifetime.
I mentioned the build system as well. With the code now split into separate modules, you can easily make a build target for TEST and SHIP binaries. It is the build system that will define things such as CLI_WRITER at build time to add the module to the TEST binary. Your CI (continuous integration) system (you are using a CI system, right?!) can now pop out binaries of both types and even run the release script that tests for the presence of the correct modules in each release.
When you cannot take away the club, sometimes you can give the monkey a less-dangerous club. Putting the dangerous debug code under
#ifdef protection, splitting the code into its own modules, and modifying the build and release system to help you ensure you do not ship the wrong thing are just some of the ways to shrink the monkey's club.
Porting with Autotools
Using tools such as Automake and Autoconf with preexisting code bases can be a major hassle.
Playing for Keeps
Will security threats bring an end to general-purpose computing?
Daniel E. Geer, Verdasys
Security Problem Solved?
Solutions to many of our security problems already exist, so why are we still so vulnerable?
John Viega, Secure Software
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