The internet revolution of democracy, which will transform earthly representative democracies by employing the communication and collaboration capabilities of the Internet, has yet to come. For this Communications Point/Counterpoint discussion, I enlist the wisdom of our forefathers to lead the way. By consulting the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,4 I distill core values of democracy and derive from them requirements for the foundations of e-democracy. Building on these foundations can usher in the urgently needed revolution of democracy.
Representative democracy is in retreat worldwide,1,5,6 as many democracies transform into oligarchies, plutocracies, or even kleptocracies. A key reason is lack of respect of democracy's basic tenetequality of rightsas the rich, the powerful, and the connected increasingly dominate who gets nominated, who gets elected, and what the elected do. The forefathers of democracy have identified this to be "... the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments."4
The Internet, on the other hand, is revolutionizing industry after industry, eaving older ways of human conduct in the dustbin of history. Yet, it has not changed the basic workings of democracy: Representative democracy today functions essentially as it did 200 years ago (Internet-enabled disruptions of elections notwithstanding).
How could this be? Why has an Internet revolution of democracy not yet occurred, despite the pressing need for it and the apparent clear ability of the Internet to deliver it? I believe a key reason is that amalgamating "Internet" and "Democracy" into an Internet democracy, or e-democracy, is more difficult than it seems.
E-democracy has at least two meanings: Using the Internet to strengthen real-world democracies,1,14 and democratic conduct of virtual Internet communities.3 When viewed as objectives they coalesce, as one entails or requires the other.
Amalgamating "Internet" and "Democracy" presupposes universal Internet access as well as Net neutrality and freedom; their absence undermines the legitimacy of e-democracy, as a regime can exclude an oppressed minority, or a service provider can make e-democracy a super-premium service, excluding the poor.
Even if the Internet infrastructure is universally accessible, neutral, and fair, utilizing an existing Internet application such as Facebook and its siblings as a foundation for e-democracy is a non-starter: They are prone to duplicate and fake accounts and, crucially, to nondemocratic oversight, control, and arbitrary intervention by their owners. Even Wikipedia, a hallmark of Internet participation, is governed neither by its readers nor by its editors, but by an appointed board that has full legal authority to shut it down, for example, to avert bankruptcy.
Hence, new foundations for e-democracy are needed. I envision these foundations to simultaneously support the democratic conduct of all types of communities: Associations, clubs, unions, cooperatives, organizations, movements, and political parties; and at all levelslocal, national, transnational, and international; eventually including cities, states, and federations; and, ultimately, uniting the entire humanity in a global e-democracy.
The prospective "customer" for e-democracy is humanity at large.
Among these communities, the pivot for revolutionizing earthly democracies may be Internet-resident democratic political parties, or e-parties. Only by winning real-world elections, e-parties can export the participatory practices of e-democracy from their inner workings to real-world governments, enacting legislation that gradually supplants traditional representative democracy by e-democracy.
But what are these foundations? Who could guide us in their construction? A standard method in requirements engineering is to interview the prospective customer. The prospective "customer" for e-democracy is humanity at large. Hence, in lieu of an interview, I enlist one of humanity's most inspiring documents: The 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen4 (henceforth: Declaration), which offers a concise, clear, and bold expression of the essence of democracy. I study its Articles, extract from them core democratic values, and derive from these values requirements for the foundations of e-democracy.
Here, I list the core democratic values extracted from the Articles (marked by A) of the Declaration (Interpreting ManPerson, CitizenMember, and NationCommunity):
To summarize, all members of a democracy must have equal capacity to act as voters, discussants, proposers and public delegates, as well as share progressively the burden of public expenditures.
I now aim to derive from these core democratic values requirements for the foundations of e-democracy.
First, I consider the question of ownership. Any seemingly sovereign e-democracy that resides on computers operated by a third party could be unplugged at its will, or its default, rendering sovereignty meaningless. Hence, in the context of an e-democracy, sovereignty requires ownership.
How can the members of an e-democracy be the sovereign and hence necessarily the owner? Advances in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology provide the first example. In a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization),3 built on top of Ethereum, the dictatorial system administrator is replaced by a smart contract, namely an autonomous, incorruptible, transparent, and persistent software agent, programmed to obey democratic decisions (albeit with one coin-one vote, not one person-one vote). The DAO operates on a distributed computer network with no central ownership. A few caveats: First, an early DAO venture capital fund had a bug that allowed a malicious member to syphon its funds. Smart-contract programming in general and the DAO architecture in particular have yet to mature to offer a sound foundation for e-democracy. Second, Ethereum and Bitcoin, while having distributed control in theory, have a core group of miners that could control and subvert them should they decide to join forces, a risk that a future e-democracy at the national or global scale cannot afford. Third, current proof-of-work consensus protocols of public blockchains incentivize inconceivable and unsustainable waste of energy, which cannot be endorsed by any moral person or organization. Fourth, a replicated ledger such as Ethereum and Bitcoin could not support the high-throughput transaction rate and response time required by a national or global e-democracy; a distributed ledger architecture is needed. Fifth, to foster participation rather than greed, a democratic cryptocurrency should reward participation,8 rather than capital-intensive coin-mining; the globally unique digital identities required for e-democracy, discussed later, may afford an egalitarian cryptocurrency.4,8 The economy of a democratic crypto-currency could be programmed with democratically instituted taxes and budgets9,15 to operate the e-democracy.
In summary, a distributed public ledger employing a democratic crypto-currency and programmed to adhere to democratic control could ensure the members of an e-democracy are its sovereign and owner.
To support equality in an e-democracy, a new notion of digital identity must be devised that is truthful, unique, persistent, and owned by the person it represents. Otherwise, if fakethe owner may vote on behalf of a non-existent person; if non-uniquethe owner may cast multiple votes; if not persistentthe owner may terminate and shed an obligated identity and acquire a fresh one clear of obligations, eluding accountability; and if not owned by the person it representsit grants its owner an extra vote at the expense of the person it represents.
While truthfulness is a common requirement, for example in credit card and mobile phone contracts, uniqueness and persistency are not, as a person may obtain numerous credit cards, mobile phones, and email accounts and terminate them at will. Government-issued identity numbers, often complemented with biometric attributes and incorporated in digital identity cards (such as e-Estonia or India's Aadhaar) may serve as a unique and persistent digital identity attribute.
However, e-democracies may transcend national boundaries, for example, in regional and international organizations. Realizing equality in global e-democracies is a bigger challenge: First, unhindered Internet access should be a recognized basic civil right and be provided universally. Second, some people, notably refugees, may have no verifiable national identity, yet should be granted participation in a global e-democracy. Third, people may have multiple citizenships, and without an additional notion of "global citizenship" with an associated globally unique digital identity, one may have multiple votes, violating equality. Fourth, malicious nondemocratic regimes may produce an arbitrary number of fake national identities and use them (in a Sybil attack6) to sway the vote of a global e-democracy in favor of their national interest.
A trustworthy notion of global citizenship; a mechanism to endow each global citizen with a truthful, persistent, and globally unique global digital identity; and a global judiciary empowered to revoke fake or duplicate global digital identities and to transfer stolen identities back to their rightful owners, as well as to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes, are all needed to ensure equality in a global e-democracy.
E-democracies will come under criminal attack through identity forgery and theft, voter coercion, misinformation, hate crimes, and other offenses. They can be redressed by the judiciary via a public warning, public condemnation, temporary gag, and fines. As suspension or, worse, expulsion, violate the basic civil right to vote, it may be considered too extreme. Imagine a future in which a person is a member of multiple e-democracies, which have a joint judicial system. A temporarily limit on participation in all these democracies simultaneously, analogous to jail time in the real world, may be severe indeed. But for such a punishment to be effective, accountability must be ensured: it is not sufficient that the offending digital identity be truthful; it has to be unique and persistent, lest the offender sheds the punishment by abandoning one identity in favor of another.
While a multiyear election cycle confers natural hysteresis on earthly democracies, e-democracies require hysteresis to be engineered, so that swings in people's opinions may not immediately result in decisions that accommodate such swings. Examples include minimal periods for proposal making and deliberation; minimal endorsements for proposals to be considered; minimal quorum for a decision to be binding; and special majority needed for certain actions, for example, change of constitution.
It is my opinion that representative democracies are in dire straits because of their failure to uphold core democratic values, notably equality and transparency, and that e-democracy may offer the only feasible remedy. I have derived requirements for the foundations of e-democracy from the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The next urgent step is to build such foundations so the desperately needed Internet revolution of earthly democracies would commence.
3. Create a Democracy contract in Ethereum, 2017; https://www.ethereum.org/dao
4. Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen; National Constituent Assembly (1789); English translation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_the_Rights_of_Man_and_of_the_Citizen
5. Democracy Index. Wikipedia, 2017; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index
9. Lee, D. T., Goel, A., Aitamurto, T. and Landemore, H. Crowdsourcing for participatory democracies: Efficient elicitation of social choice functions. In Proceedings of the Second AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP-14) (Pittsburgh, PA, 2014). AAAI Press, 2014.
12. Magna Carta Libertatum, 1215; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna_Carta
13. Mill, J.S. On Liberty. Longman, Roberts & Green, Bartleby.com, 1859, 1999.
The author thanks Ofir Raz, Amos On, Luca Cardelli, Jeffrey Sachs, Stan Letovsky, Yaniv Erlich, Benny Daon, Shani Gershi, Nimrod Talmon, Ariel Procaccia, Liav Orgad, and Raffaele Marchetti for discussions and helpful comments and Michal Golan-Mashiach and Ouri Poupko for their help.
The Digital Library is published by the Association for Computing Machinery. Copyright © 2018 ACM, Inc.
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